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Abstract
In the literature, it has been suggested that political budget cycles are context-conditional, 
i.e., do not occur in all countries or under all circumstances. What about the underlying 
economic conditions? It has already has been shown that recessionary expectations rein-
force the political budget cycle. This paper argues theoretically that opportunistic policy-
makers expecting a recession during an election year allow the primary deficit to increase 
even more when the stock of debt is very high, but reduce the deficit by more during 
an expected boom (in an election year). For the empirical estimation we use panel data 
from Portuguese municipalities. Plots of average marginal effects for election years show 
that differences between high- and low-debt municipalities become more pronounced in 
stronger expected recessions as well as booms; the stronger effect on the deficit in high-
debt municipalities is caused by changes on both the revenue and the expenditure side. A 
whole armada of robustness tests (non-linear effects, alternative specifications of excessive 
debt and forecasts, various methods to account for time effects and clustering, several sam-
ple restrictions) confirms our results.
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1 Introduction
It is seen as a stylized fact that political budget cycles (PBCs) are context-conditional, 
i.e., they do not occur in all countries or under all circumstances. Early on it was argued 
that PBCs are more likely to appear in specific country groups, e.g., developing countries 
(Schuknecht 1996) or new democracies (Brender and Drazen 2005). The emphasis then 
shifted to country characteristics like fiscal intransparency (Alt and Lassen 2006) or the 
electoral system (Aidt and Mooney 2014). Veiga et  al. (2017) confront several of those 
conditioning factors and find that media freedom is key in reducing the incidence of PBCs. 
Bohn and Veiga (2017) move the focus to economic conditions and present evidence show-
ing that recessionary expectations reinforce the political budget cycle.
This paper deepens the analysis of the effects of economic conditions on PBCs. It argues 
that local public sectors (e.g., in countries, municipalities) with high stocks of debt may 
end up with larger primary deficits in election years than those with smaller initial debts 
when a recession is expected (and vice versa for expected booms). That prediction is rel-
evant for two reasons. First, high-debt governments face recessions frequently. Second, the 
high deficit outcome may seem surprising because high-debt local governments are often 
pressured, if not obliged, to raise tax or other revenues, cut expenditures, or both, in order 
to produce primary surpluses or, at least, to reduce their primary deficits dramatically (for 
instance, in order to reach pre-set debt targets). During a recession, such actions may not be 
easy. It likewise may not be desirable; standard Keynesian countercyclical policies may be 
adopted to alleviate the macroeconomic consequences of the recession. However, efforts to 
improve primary balances should be at least as strong in the presence of high debt stocks as 
not. In fact, that is the (normal) government response to a high stock of debt in an expected 
recession in an off-election year. But why, then, is the primary deficit larger in high-debt 
governments when a recession is expected in an election year?
Our answer is very simple and we illustrate it in an opportunistic PBC model that incor-
porates boom and recession expectations. Our model shows that an opportunistic policy-
maker is immune to debt targets (including a potential reputational loss) when a recession 
is expected during an election year. Instead, such a policymaker is concerned about her 
electoral prospects, which improve if voters can be made to believe in her competence. 
Such beliefs, in turn, depend on whether the policymaker is able or not to raise public ser-
vices provision or expenditures by more than what voters expect. If so, the larger primary 
budget deficit in a high-debt government (in an election year when a recession is expected) 
is due entirely to the fact that a government of a highly indebted public sector typically 
must impose higher tax rates than otherwise and, therefore, loses more tax revenue during 
a recession. To undo that loss, and still appear competent, an opportunistic policymaker of 
a high-debt government has to accept a larger primary deficit. The opposite argument holds 
for expected boom times; an opportunistic policymaker then can plan on using the larger 
tax revenues to reduce the stock of outstanding debt without compromising her reelection 
chances.
Our logic works when excessive debt coincides with higher tax rates. But that is not 
guaranteed. In fact, excessive debt may have been produced because tax rates were too 
low in the first place. Eventually, excessive-debt governments will have to impose high 
tax rates or cut spending drastically to tackle the debt problem. It may be difficult to judge 
whether a public sector is still in the rapid debt accumulation, low tax-rate phase or in the 
excessive debt, high tax-rate phase. That is so because it is not at all obvious what consti-
tutes a high tax rate. At a country level, for instance, tax rates depend on specific factors 
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like the development of the tax system, the cost of tax enforcement (which depends, for 
instance, on the share of the agricultural sector in total output), or the willingness and abil-
ity of policymakers to use seigniorage.1 At a sub-national level, the institutions of public 
finance tend to be more coherent, i.e., tax rates and procedures for responding to exces-
sive debt are much the same, especially if procedures are in place for dealing with the 
latter. The Portuguese municipal data employed in this paper satisfy those conditions. We 
do not have tax rate data for most of our sample period, but we discuss in Footnote 18 and 
show in the Online Appendix that public revenues tend to be larger in high, excessive-debt 
municipalities.
The empirical results, obtained for a sample composed of all Portuguese municipali-
ties covering the 2002–2014 period, confirm the intuition that our model suggests robustly. 
Based on our regression results, we illustrate policy changes in election years over fore-
casted growth rates with plots of average marginal effects. Those marginal effect plots 
show larger primary budget deficits in high-debt municipalities during expected recession 
times and smaller primary deficits during expected booms (compared to low- debt munici-
palities). The difference rises for expectations of more serious recessions as well as for 
expectations of more pronounced booms.
Our results extend the discussion of context-conditionality for political budget cycles. 
The evidence shows that excessive debt, if paired with high tax rates, produces even 
stronger PBCs during recessionary periods. It captures an important mechanism with sig-
nificant policy implications. In particular, the findings say that it may even be counterpro-
ductive to prescribe harsh medicine (higher tax rates), if the excessive-debt government 
faces frequent elections during recessionary periods. Another interpretation relates to the 
role of fiscal constraints in the emergence of political budget cycles. Streb et al. (2009) dis-
cuss checks and balances that serve as institutional constraints for reducing political budget 
cycles. This paper argues that the existence of small public debts are by themselves con-
straints that limit political budget cycles (at least during recessionary periods).
We emphasize recessions and excessive debt as conditioning factors herein, but other 
conditionalities likewise may play roles (see reviews by Franzese 2002; de Haan and Klomp 
2013). First, we focus on the aggregate level of fiscal policy in terms of the primary deficit, 
but not on particular types of expenditures.2 In a robustness test, we also present results for 
total expenditures and fiscal revenues. Footnote 19 explains why such evidence provides clues 
in the direction of the results we obtain for primary deficits. Second and consequently, we do 
not account for fiscal ideologies. Given that we find a significant PBC effect, no overall fis-
cal conservatism arguably is evident, as suggested by Pelzman (1992).3 We can, however, not 
exclude the possibility that the PBC effect occurs because policymakers manipulate certain 
1 At the country level, we would also not be able to avoid having to define excessive debt in an ad-hoc way. 
For most countries, there are no legal public debt limits. Even if they exist, they are typically not binding. 
The EU fiscal rules, for instance, did establish a limit of 60% of GDP for the gross public debt of member 
countries, but it was not binding for entering the Eurozone and only received greater importance with the 
changes in the rules after the sovereign debt crisis.
2 The notion of cycles in various types of public expenditures is supported by, for instance, Schuknecht 
(2000) for capital expenditures, Drazen (2001) for transfers, Block (2002) for visible current expenditures 
and Vergne (2009) for subsidies. Cycles in the composition of expenditure also are suggested, for instance, 
by Veiga and Veiga (2007), Drazen and Eslava (2010), Schneider (2010) and Aidt and Mooney (2014).
3 And empirically supported by Hayo and Neumeier (2017) for Germany, Drazen and Eslava (2010) for 
Colombia, and Brender and Drazen (2008) for a panel of countries. Moreover, Veiga and Veiga (2007) and 
Aidt et al. (2011) find no fiscal conservatism in Portuguese municipal voting.
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types of expenditures (which we do not distinguish in the paper) in favor of some key groups 
of voters.
Our theoretical model likewise does not distinguish between different types of expenditures 
or voters. It presupposes that voters do not behave as fiscal conservatives, either because they 
do not want to or because budgetary manipulation is so effective that it overcompensates any 
fiscally conservative predisposition. The opportunistic political budget cycle model we use 
implicitly assumes that voters, rational or not, actually can be made to believe in the compe-
tence of incumbent policymakers. It was Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) and Rogoff’s (1990) idea 
that utility-maximising voters should be concerned only about the competence of the poli-
cymaker chosen for governing after the elections. If competence shocks are persistent (usu-
ally modelled as MA(1) shocks), the task of voters becomes one of competence extraction 
in deciding for whom to vote. However, even rational voters can be fooled in the presence of 
informational asymmetry. In Rogoff’s world, politicians observe their own competence skills 
before voters do; hence, we obtain a signalling model. In the Lohmann (1998) and Shi and 
Svensson (2006) world, some part of the electorate is uninformed or has some other handicap; 
in Bohn and Veiga (2017), it is inertial growth perceptions. It is important, however, that poli-
ticians cannot observe their own competence shocks. No signalling is thus possible; instead, 
the incumbent will exert some hidden effort to manipulate the outcome of the elections. Our 
model is in the latter pure moral-hazard tradition.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Indications of the solu-
tion and the main results can be found in Sect. 3. Section 4 describes the data, the institutional 
setting, and the empirical model. Section 5 presents empirical evidence (including the results 
of robustness tests) providing support for the main implications of the theoretical model. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2  Model
The model combines elements from Lohmann (1998), Shi and Svensson (2006) and Bohn 
and Veiga (2017). It captures an economy with n voters and two opportunistic candidates, 
an incumbent and a challenger, who compete for holding office every alternate period. Each 
agent’s expected utility depends on the discounted present value of expected per-period utili-
ties which, in turn, consist of additively separable economic and political utilities (  is the 
discount factor; E is the expectations operator). In each period, voters derive utility from con-
sumption c ( u(cs)) , which has the standard concavity properties, from local public goods L and 
from political utility izs (with weight  ). Voter i’s ideological preference or personal sympa-




if a is in power; zs =
1
2
 , if b is in power; without limiting the generality of the analysis we call 
a the incumbent and b the challenger). If her favorite candidate is in power, voter i receives 
positive political utility; political utility is smaller for more moderate voters, i.e., voters with 
weaker views on the candidates’ competencies. Voters vote prospectively in that they choose 
the candidate who can deliver the highest expected utility in the future. More moderate voters 
might, therefore, vote for the “wrong” candidate, if they are compensated by higher economic 





( i)s−t Et[u(cs) + Ls + 
izs]; s = t, t + 1,… ; i = 1, … , n.
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The candidates’ economic utility is the same as the voters’. However, candidates receive a 
political (dis-)utility only if they are in office: an ego rent and a potential reputation loss, 
if they also were responsible for missing pre-set debt target B∗
s−1
 (see further down) in the 
previous year:
Everybody’s expected consumption depends on expected after-tax income:
where s is the tax rate. Period-specific expected growth factor shock s captures the devia-
tion from trend (or previous period or potential) output ȳ which is normalized to 1; 𝜖s > 1 is 
an expected boom; and 𝜖s < 1 is an expected recession.
The government’s budget constraint relates primary deficit Ds to the provision of (local) 
public goods Ls . It takes into account expected tax revenue ss and the government’s compe-
tence js (see further down):
Excessive-debt municipalities are obliged to reduce their debts by a certain percentage 
every year and may have to impose a particularly high tax rate to do so. Low-debt munici-
palities do not face such requirements. In a continuous setting, we capture budget dynamics 
with two continuous functions. Every municipality’s yearly (period-specific) debt target B∗
s
 
(which depends on the initial level of debt Bt−1 ) is
We assume that the municipality’s tax rate s is predetermined and—as argued before—
also depends on the initial level of debt Bt−1 , too:
Given the interest payment on the inherited debt level Bs−1 from the previous period, and, 
possibly, debt reduction from Bs−1 to target level B∗s the government normally would be 
obliged to produce a primary surplus. Let’s call it the primary surplus requirement (com-
ponent 1) which would imply Ds < 0 and require spending cuts. However, the govern-
ment may choose to disregard the rules, especially in an election year, and maximize with 



















s = t, t + 1,… ; j = a, b; r =
{
1 if in power in period r;
0 otherwise.
(3)Ekt [cs] = E
k
t
[(1 − 𝜏s)𝜖sȳ] = (1 − 𝜏s)𝜖s, k = j, i.











); 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1 for B∗
t−1
≥ 0;
𝛿(0) =1 and 𝛿 monotonously decreasing.
(6)𝜏s = 𝜏 = 𝜏(Bt−1); with 𝜏� > 0; 𝜏�� < 0.
(7)
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As in Rogoff (1990), government competence is modelled as an MA(1) process. However, 
Shi and Svensson (2006) suggested that there new tasks always arise that do not allow can-
didates to know their own competencies js in advance:
Shocks jt are random variables with mean 0 and distribution function F[
j
t] = F[∙] . For 
simplicity, density function f [jt] = f [∙] = F�[∙] is assumed to be bell-shaped, but more 
general specifications also would be possible. Inserting Eqs.  (6) to (8) into budget con-
straint (4) we obtain:
The timing of events is presented in Table 1. Elections take place in alternating periods. At 
the beginning of election period t, voters and incumbent a observe the realizations of last 
period’s skills shock a
t−1
 and predetermined current period tax rate t . The incumbent also 
observes (period-specific) debt target B∗
t
 and growth shock t which allow her to decide on 
the optimal level of freely choosable deficit Dfreet .



















Table 1  The timing of events
Time Who does what?
Period t (1) Voters i and incumbent a observe:
 the incumbent’s last period skills a
t−1
;
 the predetermined tax rate t.
(2) Incumbent a observes:





 chooses primary deficit Dt;
 thereby providing local public goods Lt.
(4) Voters i observe:
 local public goods Lt.
(5) Voters i:
 form expectations of the incumbent’s current period skills ̂at ;
 and vote.
Period t + 1 The winner of the period t elections takes office, receives an ego rent and suffers a repu-
tation loss, if she missed debt target B∗
t
4 Voters may or may not observe the debt target and the growth shock (whereas policymakers are assumed 
to observe the growth shock correctly). The model is silent (and this does not affect the qualitative results) 
on whether their beliefs about expected growth ̂t and expected primary deficit D̂t are determined on the 
basis of full or partial information, rationally or not. Those beliefs affect voters’ expectations of the incum-
bent’s current period skills ̂at  , but the incumbent can take them as given values only when choosing her 
optimal policy.
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the primary deficit level Dt , thereby providing quantity Lt of local public goods. Voters 
observe Lt and form expectations of skills shock, ̂at  , which is, however, affected by their 
expectations of the growth shock, ̂t , and of the primary deficit, D̂t . Voters base their deci-
sions on whether to vote for the incumbent on ̂at  because period t skills affect the incum-
bent’s competence in providing local public goods in ( t + 1 ). Note that voters’ expectations 
of the incumbent’s competence can be mistaken for two reasons: (1) they may not be able 
to fully anticipate the incumbent’s deficit policy; and (2) they may not be able to anticipate 
fully an imminent economic slump or boom.
In period ( t + 1 ), the winner of the election receives ego rent X. Policy in ( t + 1 ) no 
longer depends on voting, though; hence, either policymaker (a or b) will repay the costly 
debt to the extent possible, thereby cutting the provision of local public goods.5 Voters 
anticipate that response, but can do nothing to prevent it. Note also that the voting deci-
sion in election period t does not extend to considering expected utility in t + 2 because the 
MA(1) nature of the competence process makes incumbent and challenger indistinguisha-
ble then. Policymakers likewise do not account for t + 2 in solving their optimization prob-
lem when determining the optimal level of Dfreet  because they cannot influence their own 
utility or boost their reelection chances in t + 2 . Hence, the model can be split into cycles 
of two periods consisting of election period t and off-election period ( t + 1).
3  Model solution
Given the timing of events and the reasoning for splitting the analysis into two-period 
election cycles the solution is found by studying the incumbent’s utility maximization 
over the cycle, including the election period t and off-election period ( t + 1 ). Whether 
the incumbent receives an ego rent in period ( t + 1 ) depends on the probability of being 
elected which, in turn, depends on her election year choice of the optimal level of deficit 
Dt , which ultimately depends on the choice of freely choosable deficit D
free
t  . The logic of 
the model’s solution is explained here, but details are provided in the Online Supplemen-
tary Material. Voters base their voting decisions in period t on a comparison of utilities to 
be expected from the incumbent and the challenger in period ( t + 1 ). The utility expected 





+ jt ) and individuals’ expectations thereof. Since competence is an 
MA(1) process, incumbent a’s period t choice of Dfreet  affects what voters expect of the 
incumbent’s competence in period ( t + 1 ), whereas nothing is known about the challenger. 
In Online Appendix A we derive a (in our opinion, realistic) condition for a voter to vote 
for the incumbent, which already was hinted at when explaining Eq. (1). If the voter shares 









] = 0 ) or if the voter has a different ideology (though not too far on the 
other side of the political spectrum) and the incumbent does a great job, then the voter will 
vote for the incumbent:
5 We do, however, assume that the government never falls below the period-specific debt target. B∗
t+1
 is, 
therefore, both the lower limit and the relevant debt target for period ( t + 1 ). Theoretically, it could be opti-
mal to reduce the debt level even further strategically in order to have more room for maneuver in the next 
election period ( t + 2 ), although behavior of that kind may seem unrealistic, especially when the stock of 
debt is very high. By assuming the debt target to be the lower limit for debt reduction, we follow Shi and 
Svensson (2006); they also rule out strategic behavior by not allowing the government to produce negative 
debt.
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On that basis, the individual’s probability of voting for the incumbent can be derived (see 
the end of Online Appendix A). The probability that the incumbent wins the election is, 
therefore:
Voters extract government competence a
t
 by relying on the public budget constraint (9). 
True competence is:
Voters can observe the level of local public goods Lt , the tax rate t , and previous period 
competence a
t−1
 . Their perception of government competence is, however, also affected by 
their expectations of growth and the government’s budget deficit policy. Using Eq. 13 (see 
Online Appendix B) the perception of competence Et[at ] can be expressed as:
Note that voters overestimate the incumbent’s competence ( �𝜇at > 0 ), if the government can 
raise the primary deficit above what is expected by voters. This is the standard manipula-
tion argument. However, if voters think the recession is less severe than it actually is, they 
underestimate the incumbent’s competence.
Let us now rewrite the incumbent’s probability of winning (12):
If we assumed rational expectations, no manipulation is possible in equilibrium and the 
probability of winning cannot be increased (despite the government’s best efforts in doing 
so, as seen in first-order condition  17). Under other behavioral assumptions for voters’ 
expectations, the probability of winning can be affected by the incumbent’s choice. For the 
core result of the paper it does not matter whether the winning probability can be affected 
or not. We, therefore, take an agnostic point of view at this stage, but will discuss the effect 
of voters’ assumptions when discussing Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 further down.
The incumbent’s two-period maximization problem can now be written as follows (see end 
of Online Appendix B and Appendix C; Xs is held constant and discount factor  is set to 1 
because it is irrelevant for the qualitative properties of the results):






















(14)Et[at ] = ̂
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{u((1 − )t) + Lt + X}
+ Ea
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{(1 − Probwin)[u((1 − )t+1) + Lt+1]};
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 (because the second order condition for an optimum is satisfied):
The FOC is staightforward. The interest rate (which is the net marginal loss from incurring 
a deficit) must be equal to the net marginal gain from increasing the chances of winning. 
The latter is the net benefit for the government (ego rent minus reputation loss) times the 
marginal increase in winning chances owing to the increase in voter-perceived governmen-
tal competence caused by the increase in deficit-financed public goods.
As the FOC defines the equilibrium for any expected growth rate t , we can now study 
the effect of (reduced or aggravated) boom or recessionary expectations:
Lemma 1 Growth Expectations.
Expectations of imminent boom (higher t in Eq. 16) reduce the government’s chosen 
optimal deficit Dfreet
∗
 as well as the overall primary deficit Dt in equilibrium. (Recessionary 
expectations raise it.)
Proof Online Appendix D.   □
The lemma says that a countercyclical policy effect materializes in election years. An 
opportunistic government will compensate for the tax revenue shortfall during the reces-
sion by an equal increase in the budget deficit. Conversely, an opportunistic government 
can reduce the deficit by the amount of additional tax revenue. The motivation is clear, the 
government does not give voters reason to believe that it would not be able to provide the 
same quantity of public goods with or without a recession or a boom. Recall that the opti-
mal choice of public goods and, hence, of the deficit already is elevated as indicated by the 
first-order condition. The lemma says only that the government does not want to provoke a 
reduction in its competence as perceived by voters.
Lemma  1 can be illustrated in a stylized situation. Figure  1 captures a balanced 
budget situation, if output is at trend level. Situations to the left produce a budget defi-
cit, those to the right a budget surplus. This is so because we assume that revenues 
are given by an upward-sloping straight line, which is determined purely by economic 
activity. For simplicity, no countercyclical (Keynesian) response to recessions is under-
taken. Government expenditures do not respond to output; the government can change 
expenditures only discretionarily. Given that set-up, Lemma  1 simply says that an 
opportunistic government that expects a recession will not content itself with the “Nor-






= 1 − (1 + rt) + F






































= 0 − 𝜏(B∗
t−1
)𝜖t < 0.
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dark [green] arrow. It will, therefore, plan on compensating for the revenue shortfall by 
increasing the deficit so that the no-recession level of manipulated government services 
can be provided despite the expected economic downturn (in order to appear compe-
tent). The extent of manipulation overall will be the sum of both arrows.
It is important to note that the result of precisely compensating for the tax revenue 
shortfall was obtained on the basis of given voter expectations for growth, ̂t , and defi-
cit, D̂t  . If, for instance, voters were to expect a less severe recession than the govern-
ment does, then the government would think that it will be harder to convince voters of 
its competence. Hence, the manipulation and the countercyclical policy effect would be 
strengthened. If, however, voters believed that the government would raise the deficit by 
less than the tax revenue shortfall, then it actually would be possible for an opportun-
istic government to increase the deficit by less. Hence, less manipulation would suffice 
and the countercyclical policy effect would be reduced. Analogous arguments could be 
made for expected booms. The factors determining the magnitude of the countercyclical 
policy effect already were studied by Bohn and Veiga (2017).
The focus of this paper is on how the countercyclical policy effect is influenced by 
the pre-existing debt level:
Proposition 1 Excessive Debt.
An increase in excessive debt reinforces the effect of growth expectations at the 
equilibrium.









Fig. 1  Expenditure and revenue
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The proposition says that opportunistic policymakers in governments with high ini-
tial stocks of debt will choose larger deficits in expected recessions and smaller def-
icits in expected booms compared to governments with lower debt levels, when they 
face an election. The proposition is a direct result of the countercyclical policy effect 
derived in Lemma 1, together with Eq.  (6), which is, admittedly, a simple, but also a 
very plausible assumption, namely that tax rates are higher in high-debt entities. Even 
if the countercyclical policy effect were reduced for one of the aforementioned reasons, 
Proposition 1 still would hold. It captures the testable prediction that very indebted gov-
ernments manipulate fiscal policy, in particular the primary budget deficit, more than 
governments with lower initial debt levels.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated in an analogous way. Figure 2 compares the situation 
of a low-debt and an excessive-debt municipality. The low-debt municipality is identi-
cal to the municipality of Fig. 1; thin lines and a normal text font are used. Our stylized 
excessive-debt municipality is different in two respects (fat lines and italicized text [all 
in red] are used). First, the government revenue line is steeper and above the line for the 
low-debt municipality. Second, at trend output a primary surplus is assumed to be used 
for debt repayment (for simplicity, we assume no debt repayment in the low-debt munic-
ipality). In normal times, the excessive-debt municipality likewise would experience a 
“Normal PBC” (light [textured] arrow with thick borders) at trend output. However, the 
expected revenue shortfall in case of a recession is much larger (dark [textured] arrow 
with thick borders). In order to appear competent, the no-recession level of manipu-
lated government services must be provided despite the expected downturn. Hence, an 
Fig. 2  Expenditure and revenue 2
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excessive-debt municipality must increase the primary budget deficit by more than a 
low-debt municipality. The opportunistic countercyclical policy effect is thus larger.6
4  Data, setting, and empirical model
This section describes the data, the institutional setting for Portuguese municipalities, and 
the empirical model.
4.1  Data and regional GDP growth forecasts
The model’s implication (Proposition  1) that the stock of public debt affects the way in 
which the government adjusts the primary deficit in response to economic performance 
(booms or recessions) is tested using data for Portuguese local governments. Municipal 
finance data were obtained from the Portuguese Directorate General of Local Authori-
ties (DGAL), information regarding the dates of local elections and mayors’ characteris-
tics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and demographic and economic data from the 
National Statistics Institute (INE). GDP data are not available at the municipal (NUTS IV)7 
level. Therefore, we collected data for the most disaggregated level available—NUTS III. 
Since data on municipal debt are available only since 2002, and data on regional GDP 
available from 1991 to 2014, our dataset covers the period from 2002 to 2014.
No GDP growth rate forecasts are made at either the municipal or the regional levels. 
National 1-year-ahead forecasts, produced by the Portuguese government, are available in 
the macroeconomic scenario of the national budget, which is presented to the Portuguese 
Parliament in October, shortly before the municipalities also must draft their budgets for 
the following year. Since the formula-determined transfers that municipalities receive from 
the central government are indicated in the national budget, the transfers must be taken into 
account when elaborating the municipal budgets.
Assuming that mayors form their expectations of next year’s GDP growth rates based on 
the government’s forecast of national real GDP growth,8 and information on their regions’ 
current and past growth rates, we obtain 1-year-ahead forecasts estimating the following 
ARIMAX(2,0,1), i.e., ARMAX(2,1).9 The model for the NUTS III GDP growth rates in 
each region is specified as
7 NUTS is the European Union’s nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided into 
three NUTS I regions (Mainland, Azores and Madeira), seven NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS III regions. 
Each NUTS III region aggregates several municipalities, which correspond to the NUTS IV level. Portugal 
has 308 municipalities, 278 on the mainland and 30 in the archipelagos of Azores (19) and Madeira (11).
8 The 1-year-ahead GDP growth forecasts from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) also are 
entered in robustness tests.
9 Short-run forecasts commonly are generated using ARIMA and ARIMAX models (see Enders 2014). 
ARIMA is a univariate time series model that uses autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) compo-
nents of the dependent variable to explain or forecast its behavior. ARIMAX uses the AR and MA compo-
nents jointly with a vector X of other explanatory variables. When the dependent variable is not stationary 
(i.e., integrated), it is necessary to take differences of it in the order of integration. The strategy suggested 
by Box and Jenkins (1976) is used to choose the most appropriate model. Since regional growth rates were 
found to be stationary, there is no need to take first-differences of the series. The ARMAX(2,1) specifica-
tion was the one found to be most appropriate for the majority of NUTS III regions.
6 The average marginal election effects of total expenditures, discussed in footnote  19, suggest that the 
opportunistic policy effect might be even larger.
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where RegGDPt is the real GDP growth rate for the region under scrutiny in year t, 
NatGDPft is the national real GDP growth forecast for year t (obtained from the national 
budget for year t), and t is a white noise error term. The predicted values from the estima-
tion of equation (18) for each of the 25 NUTS III regions10 are used in our empirical analy-
sis as the regional growth forecasts.11
4.2  Institutional setting of Portuguese municipalities
Municipalities are the second highest government tier on mainland Portugal, just below 
the national government, and the third in the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira, where 
regional governments also are present. Regardless of their locations, all Portuguese munic-
ipalities are subject to the same laws and regulations, have the same institutional structure, 
and have the same responsibilities regarding public service provision: sewage, distribution 
of water, local transportation and communication, basic schooling, property maintenance, 
promotion of culture and science, recreation and sports facilities, local healthcare, social 
housing, environmental protection, and municipal policing. Regarding institutional struc-
ture, the Town Council (Câmara Municipal) holds the executive power, while the Munici-
pal Assembly holds the legislative power, approving, among other things, the municipal 
budgets and activity plans. The members of both government branches are elected directly 
by citizens, who vote on closed party or independent lists of candidates. The top candidate 
on the list receiving most votes for the Town Council becomes the mayor, presides over 
that chamber and plays a leading role in the executive branch, having substantial power and 
autonomy.
Although the financial regime for local governments grants financial autonomy to 
municipalities, allowing them to elaborate and approve their own budgets without needing 
approval from a higher-ranked authority, the large majority of municipalities is depends 
heavily on grants from the central government or from the European Union (own revenues 
account, on average, for just one-third of total effective revenues). The municipal budget is 
drafted by the mayor’s team, analyzed by the Town Council, and finally approved by the 
Municipal Assembly, in the last quarter of the year prior to the relevant fiscal year (which 
aligns with the calendar year). As 79% of the mayors are supported by majorities in both 
chambers (see Table E.2 in Online Appendix E), they can get their budgets approved easily. 
Municipalities are allowed to run budget deficits, but they are subject to limits regarding 
the stock of municipal debt. The current financial regime (Law n. 73/2013) stipulates that 
gross debt should not exceed 1.5 times the average current revenues of the last 3 years, 
and a municipality whose debt is above the legal limit is obliged to reduce the excess debt 
by 10% each year (which would correspond to  = 0.9 in the theoretical model). If gross 
(18)
RegGDPt = 0 + 1RegGDPt−1 + 2RegGDPt−2 + 3NatGDPft + t + 4t−1,
10 The results of the estimation of the ARMAX model for each of the 25 Portuguese NUTS III regions are 
reported in Table E.1 in Online Appendix E.
11 The accuracy of the forecasts for the period considered in the estimations is as follows: mean error 
(ME) = 0.30, mean absolute error (MAE) = 2.04, root mean squared error (RMSE) = 2.65. For the national 
forecasts: ME = 0.87; MAE = 1.37; RMSE = 1.68. Larger errors in regional forecasts were expected, since 
regional growth rates exhibit more volatility than national growth rates (the standard deviations are, respec-
tively, 1.92 and 3.54). Regarding the correlation between actual and forecasted values, it is 0.66 for regions 
and 0.67 at the national level. Overall, the accuracy of the regional forecasts generated by the ARMAX 
models appears to be quite reasonable.
442 Public Choice (2019) 180:429–449
1 3
debt is twice the legal limit, the municipality is forced to submit an adjustment plan to the 
Municipal Support Fund (Fundo de Apoio Municipal).12
Municipal elections were held for the first time in December 1976, following the mili-
tary coup of 1974, which ended 48 years of dictatorship. Local elections were held every 
3 years until 1985, and every 4 years thereafter (in December until 2001, and in October 
since then). Although national legislative elections sometimes occurred in the same year 
(at least three months apart, though), national, regional, or European elections never coin-
cided with municipal elections.
4.3  Empirical model
The first result of the theoretical model regarding how the primary deficit responds to 
expected growth rates (Lemma 1) is tested with the following empirical model:
where Di,t is the primary budget deficit of municipality i in year t in real euros (of 2015) 
per capita; ElYi,t is a dummy variable that equals one in municipal election years, and zero 
otherwise; RegGDPfi,t is the forecast of real GDP growth for year t in the region to which 
municipality i belongs (estimated using the ARMAX model of Eq. 18); i,t is a vector of 
control variables which may affect budget balances; i represents unobserved municipality-
specific fixed effects; t represents time-specific effects;13 and i,t is the error term. The 
forecasted regional real GDP growth rate, RegGDPfi,t is interacted with ElYi,t , so that we 
can check whether the effects of expectations for economic growth in election years are dif-
ferent from those in the other years of the electoral cycle.14
Based on the theoretical model and on previous empirical evidence of PBCs in Portu-
guese municipalities (e.g., Bohn and Veiga 2017; Aidt et al. 2011; Veiga and Veiga 2007), 
we expect a positive 1 , consistent with larger budget deficits in election years. Addition-
ally, a negative 3 is expected, given the model’s prediction that expected negative or unu-
sually low growth rates lead to larger deficits, while positive growth rates lead to surpluses. 
The overall election-year effect on the budget balance is given by (1 + 3 ∗ RegGDPfi,t).
The vector i,t includes the following control variables, which may affect budget bal-
ances: dependency ratio;15 population density; dummy variables for left-wing and inde-
pendent mayors; years in office (of the mayor); a dummy variable, Majority, which takes 
(19)Di,t = 1ElYi,t + 2RegGDPfi,t + 3(ElY ∗ RegGDPf )i,t + �i,t + i + t + i,t,
12 Legal debt limits varied over time, with successive versions of the local finance law. The choice of the 
limit currently in force is based on an exercise done in 2012 by the Technical Secretariat responsible for 
drafting the proposed revision of the Local Finance Law, of which one of the authors was a member. The 
idea was to determine the level of debt (relative to the level of current revenues) that, if surpassed at the 
beginning of the 2000s, would lead clearly to excessive debt 10 years later. Thus, although the limit was not 
adopted during our entire sample period, it nevertheless can be used as reference for the definition of exces-
sive debt. As a robustness check, other thresholds will be adopted in the empirical analysis.
13 Since the election-year dummy would be collinear with yearly dummy variables, we control for time 
effects using 5-year period dummies. In robustness tests, we also use 4-year mandate dummies and a cubic 
time trend.
14 A similar model was used in Bohn and Veiga (2017). However, there, the focus was on identifying a 
countercyclical policy effect in periods with recessionary expectations. Several dummies were employed to 
test the effect of recessionary expectations on the deficit.
15 The dependency ratio is the percentage of the population below 15 or above 65 years old. Population and 
population growth never were statistically significant when entered, and sometimes caused problems of col-
linearity.
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the value of one when the mayor is supported by majorities in both the Town Council and 
the Municipal Assembly, and zero otherwise.
An extended version of the model of Eq. (19) tests the theory’s main prediction that a 
larger stock of municipal debt exaggerates the government’s primary deficit response to 
expected booms or recessions (Proposition 1). The extended version can be presented as 
follows:
where ExcessDebti,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the gross debt of 
municipality i in year t is greater than 1.5 times the average current revenues of the last 
3 years, and equals zero otherwise. The remaining variables are as described above. The 
models of Eqs. (19) and (20) will be estimated with fixed effects, with standard errors clus-
tered by NUTS III region and year. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper 
are presented in Online Appendix E (Table E.2).
5  Empirical results
Here, we present empirical results to test Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 of the theoretical 
model; we also discuss an array of robustness tests.
5.1  Growth expectations
The results of the estimation of the model of Eq. (19) for the primary deficit (in real euros 
per capita), by fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by NUTS III regions and years 
are reported in column 1 of Table  2. In order to facilitate interpretation, the marginal 
effects for the election year, over the forecasted growth rates, are illustrated in Fig.  3.16 
As predicted by Lemma 1 of the theoretical model, expected recessions (negative growth 
forecasts) in election years lead to even larger primary deficits, as local governments will 
not want to bear the electoral costs of reducing the provision of local public goods in order 
to compensate for lower tax revenues. The effect on the deficit is positive and statistically 
significant, except for 4% positive growth. That is, the primary deficit tends to be larger in 
election years than in the other years of the political cycle, for practically the entire range 
of predicted growth rates. That finding is consistent with the results of previous studies 
(e.g., Bohn and Veiga 2017; Aidt et al. 2011; Veiga and Veiga 2007), which likewise found 
evidence of political budget cycles in Portuguese municipalities.
The coefficient for regional real GDP forecasts is positive, indicating that primary deficits 
are reduced in non-election years when the economy is expected to slow down, which could be 
interpreted as precautionary fiscal policy. Note, however, that, as discussed in the next subsec-
tion, the coefficient is much reduced and becomes insignificant in the specification of column 
(20)
Di,t =1ElYi,t + 2RegGDPfi,t + 3ExcessDebt + 4(ElY ∗ RegGDPf )i,t
+ 5(ElY ∗ ExcessDebt)i,t + 6(RegGDPf ∗ ExcessDebt)i,t
+ 7(ElY ∗ RegGDPf ∗ ExcessDebt)i,t + 
�
i,t
 + i + t + i,t,
16 Since only about 1% of the distribution of forecasted growth rates is below − 6%, and only another 1% is 
above 4%, Fig. 3 only shows the marginal effects for forecasted growth rates within that interval.
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3 (where the effect is picked up by the interaction term with excessive debt municipalities). As 
for the control variables, only the dependency ratio is (marginally) statistically significant, with 
a negative sign, indicating—somewhat surprisingly—that larger population shares of younger 
and senior people are associated with smaller deficits. However, that variable also becomes 
insignificant in the specifications of columns 2 and 3 described below.
In column 2 of Table 2, we control for time effects with year dummies, instead of 5-year 
period dummies. That change has the drawback of forcing the exclusion of the dummy 
variable for the election year, but has the advantage of accounting for other events that may 
Table 2  Countercyclicality in PBCs
Regressions with fixed effects for municipalities and standard errors clustered by NUTS III region and year. 
T-statistics based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses
***p < 0.01 , **p < 0.05 , * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3)
Election year 61.968*** 62.903***
(8.752) (8.304)
Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 4.290** 5.805** 1.166
(2.482) (2.496) (0.694)




Election year * Excess debt 2.732
(0.168)
Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 8.976***
(3.481)




Mayor left − 14.473 − 12.727 − 12.258
(− 1.262) (− 1.125) (− 1.073)
Mayor independent 32.816 37.428 34.976
(1.160) (1.332) (1.233)
Years mayor − 0.714 − 0.873 − 0.825
(− 1.201) (− 1.318) (− 1.393)
Majority 0.194 1.681 0.477
(0.017) (0.150) (0.042)
Dependency ratio − 5.123* − 2.876 − 4.307
(− 1.780) (− 1.038) (− 1.487)
Population density 0.037 0.048 0.035
(1.030) (1.314) (1.019)
Election years–Non-election years 52.656***
(7.982)
Time effects controlled for using: 5-Year Yearly 5-Year
Dummies Dummies Dummies
Number of Observations 4002 4002 4002
R-squared 0.118 0.129 0.124
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have happened in specific election years. In order to economize on space, we do not report 
the coefficients for the year dummies. Instead, we test the hypothesis that the effects for 
election years are equal to those for non-election years. As shown towards the bottom of 
the table, the difference between election and non-election year effects is substantial (52.66 
euros per capita) and statistically significant. Thus, our results are robust to controlling for 
time in that alternative manner (as well as to mandate dummies as discussed in the subsec-
tion on robustness tests further down).
5.2  Excessive debt
The results of the estimation of the model of Eq.  (20), which takes the municipal debt 
stock into account, are reported in column 3 of Table 2. Since the interpretation of coef-
ficients is not trivial when triple interactions are entered, the average marginal effects of 
the election year are illustrated in Fig. 4, for municipalities with and without excessive debt 
( ExcessDebt = 1 and ExcessDebt = 0 , respectively),17 over the forecasted growth rates.
Both lines are negatively sloped, indicating a negative relationship between deficits and 
forecasted growth rates, as shown in Fig. 3. The larger slope of the marginal effects line 
for municipalities with excessive debt is consistent with the prediction made in Proposi-
tion 1 of the theoretical model, namely, that, in election years, voters are more sensitive 
























−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Estimated forecast of real GDP growth in the NUTS3 region
Fig. 3  Average marginal effects of the election year
17 The dummy variable ExcessDebt takes the value of one if the gross debt of the municipality exceeds the 
legal limit of 1.5 times its average current revenues over the previous 6 years, and equals zero otherwise.
18 This happens because municipalities with excessive debts tend to have higher tax rates and, therefore, 
suffer larger revenue losses during recessions than less-indebted municipalities. Although we do not have 
information on municipal tax rates for most of the sample period and, thus, cannot test the relationship 
directly, we show in Table E.3 in Online Appendix E that, regardless of the time horizon considered, fiscal 
revenue tends to increase more in high-debt municipalities (for which we estimate two specifications, either 
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That is, in an election year, excessive-debt municipalities register relatively larger primary 
deficits for more negative forecasted growth rates, while they have smaller deficits, or even 
surpluses, for higher growth rates.19 Only for expected growth rates between − 1 and 1% it 
is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the primary deficit is the same for both types of 
municipalities.
The positive sign of the interaction term between excessive debt and the GDP forecast 
in column 3 of Table 2 may seem counterintuitive. It does, however, follow the precaution-
ary policy logic discussed in the previous subsection. The positive coefficient means that in 
an excessive-debt municipality, a smaller deficit is run in an expected recession during an 
off-election year. Recession in an excessive-debt municipality implies a larger revenue loss 
(see also Footnote 18). Precautionary behavior then means extra cautious fiscal policy in an 
excessive-debt municipality.
In order to check for eventual non-linear effects of forecasted regional real GDP growth, 
we included a squared term in the model of Eq. (20). As shown in Fig. 5, the effects are 
similar to those obtained when accounting only for linear effects of forecasted regional 


























−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Estimated forecast of real GDP growth in the NUTS3 region
excess_debt=0 excess_debt=1
Fig. 4  Average marginal effects of the election year
19 The graphs of Figure F.1 in Online Appendix F suggest that, in excessive debt municipalities, the large 
deficits in election years during severe recessions are associated with both an increase in expenditures and a 
decline in fiscal revenues.
Footnote 18 (continued)
debt ratios in the initial period or the excessive debt criterion adopted throughout the paper, also as of the 
initial period).
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5.3  Robustness tests
The robustness of our main empirical results (column 3 of Table 2) was checked in several 
ways.20 First, we tried two different definitions of excessive debt: debt ratio above 2 (debt 
stock above twice the average current revenues of the last 3 years); and debt ratio above 
its sample median (1.3 times average current revenues of the last 3  years). The results, 
shown in Table F.1 in Online Appendix F are similar to those of Table 2, indicating that 
our results are robust to using alternative definitions of excessive debt.
Second, we checked the robustness of the results to minor respecifications: excluding vec-
tor X of control variables; controlling for time effects with 4-year mandate dummies (instead 
of 5-year period dummies); and clustering standard errors by municipality (instead of by 
region and year). Then, we checked if results changed when forecasts of national GDP growth 
rates were used instead of forecasts for growth in NUTS III regions. As shown in Table F.2 in 
Online Appendix F, the results remain practically the same as in column 3 of Table 2.
Finally, we also checked whether the results were sensitive to three sample restrictions: 
excluding the 30 municipalities of the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira, as they have 
regional governments; excluding 100 municipalities for which formula-determined grants 
from the central government exceed 50% of total revenues (excluding loans), as those 
municipalities’ revenues are less sensitive to the business cycle than those of local govern-
ments that rely more on own revenues; and, excluding term-limited mayors (in our sample, 
a total of 160, but only in the term leading up to the 2013 elections) as they have weaker 
incentives to behave opportunistically in election years. Again, the results, reported in 


























−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Estimated forecast of real GDP growth in the NUTS3 region
excess_debt=0 excess_debt=1
Fig. 5  Average marginal effects of the election year (non-linear GDP growth effects)
20 The robustness tests’ results are shown in tables only. Nevertheless, the respective figures are similar to 
those shown above; they are available from the authors upon request.
448 Public Choice (2019) 180:429–449
1 3
6  Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to show that it makes sense for policymakers of highly indebted 
local governments (e.g., countries, municipalities) facing an election to raise the primary 
budget deficit beyond what policymakers dealing with a smaller stock of debt will do, when 
faced with a recession (and vice versa for a boom). When tax rates are higher in high-debt 
entities, the tax revenue shortfall is more significant, but opportunistic policymakers will 
try to compensate for it in order to avoid giving the impression of being incompetent. We 
obtain robust support from our empirical investigation of Portuguese municipalities that 
recessions, elections, and high debt form an unholy trinity. That combination is shown to 
apply specifically to Portuguese municipalities, but the theoretical model illustrates that the 
underlying mechanism is more generally relevant.
Our finding is important because high-debt governments often face recessions and are 
thus tempted to manipulate fiscal policy more when elections are on the horizon. Such 
behavior may be particularly relevant for high-debt countries, because they often face both 
recessions and more frequent elections at the same time. Clear policy conclusions can be 
drawn from the theoretical mechanism we suggest. Rules and obligations for the govern-
ment may not help much. Effective deficit and thus debt reduction may work only if voters 
can be made fully aware of the (expected) economic conditions; and if their expectations of 
government expenditures and services provisions can be lowered sufficiently. Such aware-
ness reduces the magnitude of the competence-pretence game the government has to play.
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